Abstract-We consider the problem of assessing the reliability of a 1-out-of-2 software-based system, in which failures of the two channels cannot be assumed to be independent with certainty. An informal approach to this problem assesses the channel probabilities of failure on demand (pfds) conservatively, and then multiplies these together in the hope that the conservatism will be sufficient to overcome any possible dependence between the channel failures. Our intention here is to place this kind of reasoning on a formal footing. We introduce a notion of "not worse than independence" and assume that an assessor has a prior belief about this, expressed as a probability. We obtain a conservative prior system pfd, and show how a conservative posterior system pfd can be obtained following the observation of a number of demands without system failure. We present some illustrative numerical examples, discuss some of the difficulties involved in this way of reasoning, and suggest some avenues of future research.
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BACKGROUND
W E consider the problem of assessing the reliability of a 1-out-of-2 system in which the two software-based channels are "diverse" as a result of having been developed independently of one another (indeed, their designs may have been forced to be diverse by imposing diverse development procedures upon their designers). Such design-diverse fault-tolerant systems have been used successfully in some safety critical applications (see [9] , [14] ).
While there is some general evidence that this kind of design-diverse fault tolerance is a good way of achieving high reliability-for example from experiments-there are serious difficulties in assessing the reliability of a particular system. An important problem arises from the fact that we can never be certain that the channels in such a system will fail independently: So, for a 1-out-of-2 system we cannot simply multiply together the channel pfds to obtain the system pfd. In several experiments-for example, [6] , [3] -"independently" developed software versions (channels) were shown to fail dependently. In fact there was a tendency for the dependence to be positive, i.e., the versions failed together more frequently than would have been the case if failures were independent. Even in these experiments, however, there was on average some benefit gained from the use of multiple channels (compared with single versions) [6] , even if this was not as great as it would have been under independence.
The experimental results were confirmed in some contemporary theoretical modeling, which also provided a conceptual framework for understanding reasons for failure dependence [4] , [8] . The basic idea introduced by Eckhardt and Lee is that "problem difficulty" varies over the demand space: Some demands are "intrinsically harder" than others. That is, it is harder to build a program that executes such a demand correctly (i.e., the chance of a particular program doing so is smaller). If channel A fails on a randomly selected demand, one should conclude that this was probably a difficult demand, and thus the chance of channel B failing on the same demand is greater than it otherwise would be: That is, this conditional probability of B failing is great than B's marginal pfd. The result is that there is positive association between channel failures, and the 1-out-of-2 system pfd is greater than it would be if independence of failures could be assumed.
Littlewood and Miller generalize this result to the case where diversity is forced by employing deliberately different "methodologies" to develop A and B. In this case, the variation of difficulty for A will generally be different from that of B: Demands that are hard for B may be easier for A and vice versa. It is shown that in this case the association between channel failures can be either positive or negative-that is, it is possible to do better than the case of independence (the 1-out-of-2 system pfd can be smaller than the product of the two channel pfds). Whether it is practically feasible to force the methodologies to be sufficiently different that the channels exhibit such negatively associated failure behavior remains a moot point. If it is possible, it is unlikely that one could be certain that negative association of failures had been achieved for a particular pair of channels.
In summary, then, the position is this. While there is evidence that this approach may be effective-in some average sense-in achieving system reliability, it is difficult to assess the reliability of a particular design-diverse system. This is because the level of association between the failures of the diverse channels will not be known-in particular it cannot be assumed that they will fail independently. These problems of assessment are important because they are a barrier to the use of what is otherwise one of the most promising approaches to very high system reliability. 1 An interesting way around this difficulty arose in some discussions the authors had with engineers involved in the licensing of a two-channel, 1-out-of-2 protection system. The pfd of the system was required to be no worse than 10 À6 . It was expected that there would be extensive analysis of the "diversity-seeking" decisions involved in the designs of the two channels, so it may be reasonable to conclude that any dependence between the channel failure processes would be modest. The pfd claims for the two channels-10
À4
and 10 À2 -were believed to be very conservative, sufficiently so that taking the product of these, it was claimed, would give a conservative value for the system pfd even in the possible presence of some positive dependence between the channels.
The difficulty with this kind of reasoning, we think, is that it makes a tradeoff between very different things: pessimism in channel claims against optimism in claims about joint failure behavior. It seems reasonable to ask how optimistic the independence claim is (i.e., how dependent the channel failures actually are) and how pessimistic the channel claims are-and then to ask whether the latter is sufficient to overcome the former. A more subtle critique of this kind of reasoning would ask for confidence in claims to be made explicit (and preferably quantitative): For example, what confidence could be placed in the system pfd claim of 10 À6 given particular evidence of tradeoff between pessimism about channel claims and optimism about channel dependence? This issue of "confidence" is often neglected in claims about even life-critical systems: For example, standards such as IEC16508:2010 treat the reliability levels (such as pfds) associated with safety integrity levels (SILs) as if these could be claimed with certainty. See [2] for a discussion of the wider issues here.
In the work reported here, we aim to put this kind of "tradeoff" reasoning on a more rigorous footing to make conservative claims for multichannel systems in the presence of likely channel failure dependence. We begin with a brief examination of the nature of "association," or dependence, between channel failures, with the intent of explicitly modeling the uncertainty here. Fig. 1 illustrates the spectrum of possible dependence between channel failures. It ranges from a best case where there are no coincident failures (the failure regions of the input space for channel A and channel B are disjoint), to a worst case where all failures are coincident (the failure regions are identical). It is clear from the figure that independence is a very special case: It is just one point in the "middle" of this spectrum.
For a particular pair of channels, there will be a point on the spectrum, x, that represents the degree of association between failures of that pair. We might express this numerically, for example, as the ratio pfd AB =pfd A :pfd B .
The important point is that there is uncertainty about the value of x: An assessor could not be certain that x took a particular point value on the spectrum. It is appropriate, therefore, to treat x as a random variable, and an assessor can be expected to have some prior beliefs about it (such beliefs might be based, for example, on knowledge of how the two channels were developed). As is often the case, it seems unlikely that an assessor would be able to state a complete prior distribution for x. We propose to examine the case where the assessor can tell us a single point on this distribution, specifically his probability that x is not greater Fig. 1 . The spectrum of possible association between channel failures of a 1-out-of-2 diverse system.
1. Although it should be said that other approaches to achieving high reliability also pose great difficulties in assessing what has been achieved in a particular instance. In fact, many claims for the efficacy of software engineering processes concern their "on average" performance, and what is achieved in a particular instance can be very different from this average. Also, it must be admitted that the empirical support, even for these average effects, is often weak. than 1. This is his confidence that the association of channel failures is not positive in Fig. 1 (that pfd AB is not greater than pfd A :pfd B Þ, i.e., channel failures are not worse than independent (NWTI).
Notice that in this case the assessor is expressing his belief about x as a probability associated with an interval on the spectrum of dependence. This seems more reasonable than associating a probability with a point on the spectrum-in particular with the "independence" point, x ¼ 1. We might be prepared to regard as reasonable an assessor's claim of the kind "I am 90 percent sure that x is no greater than 1," but not a claim such as "I am 90 percent sure that x ¼ 1." More formally, we assume that the distribution representing his belief about x is absolutely continuous, and thus has zero probability mass at a point.
We believe that the most convincing use for the results in the remainder of this paper lies in allowing assessors (or, more importantly, assessors of assessors, such as regulators) to challenge claims based on the informal trade-off arguments described above: "If your channel claims are pessimistic by this amount, and you have seen this amount of failure-free testing, then it follows that your doubt in NWTI needs to be smaller than this."
MODEL BASED ON AN ASSESSOR'S LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE THAT "CHANNEL FAILURES ARE NOT WORSE THAN INDEPENDENT"
The basic idea here is similar to that we proposed in [1] . In that paper it was shown how to obtain a conservative pfd for a single channel based on an assessor's limited prior belief, together with some failure-free operational testing. It is well known that people find it hard to express their subjective prior belief as a complete distribution for an unknown parameter (in this case channel pfd). Instead, in this work, it was assumed that the assessor was only able to state a single percentile (i.e., single point on the abscissa of his subjective cumulative distribution) for his prior belief about the channel pfd: Thus, he might just be able to say, for example, "I am 90 percent confident that the pfd is smaller than 10 À3 ," more generally provide a single pair of numbers (x, y) representing his subjective probability (1 À x) that the pfd is smaller than y.
There will in general be an infinite number of distributions, satisfying such a single percentile constraint, which would be candidates to represent the assessor's complete prior belief about pfd (if he were able to express this). It is easy to see that, of all such complete prior distributions that satisfy the percentile constraint, the one that gives most conservative mean pfd is a simple two-point distribution (see Fig. 2 ). In the case of the example of the previous paragraph, this distribution is the one that places 90 percent of the probability at 10 À3 and the remaining 10 percent at 1. More surprisingly, it was also shown that following seeing the execution of some demands without failure, another two-point prior distribution (one satisfying the assessor's percentile constraint) gives the most conservative posterior mean pfd. The interpretation of this is that the assessor can treat this value as a conservative bound for his true probability of failure on demand-for example, in a wider safety case.
In the current work, we reason similarly; the difference is that we are now reasoning about the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 system made up of two channels A and B. We begin, for simplicity, by assuming that the channel pfds are known with certainty: pfd A ; pfd B . This assumption can later be relaxed by using the results of [1] upon each channel. So the only uncertainty concerns the degree of association between the failures of channel A and channel B. The assessor's confidence-his prior probability-that there is no positive association between channel failures (NWTI) is 1 À d AB ð0Þ. That is, the probability d AB ð0Þ is the assessor's doubt, expressed as a probability, that the channel failures are independent or better. That is, the assessor's prior distribution, fðpÞ, for the system probability of failure, P F D AB , 3 has a ð1 À d AB ð0ÞÞ Â 100 percentile at pfd A :pfd B , i.e., 2. The notation here anticipates the more general one we require later in the paper, when we show how such confidence/doubt changes as a result of seeing N failure-free demands. Here, N ¼ 0.
3. We shall use, as far as possible, upper case letters to indicate random variables and lower case letters to represent their realizations. [1] . At top is an ideal complete distribution for an assessor's belief. However, he is unable to express the infinite number of probabilities implicit in this figure, and can only give us a single percentile (x, y) of the distribution: that is, the area, x, to the right of a single point, y. Below is the most pessimistic of all possible distributions, fðpÞ, that satisfy his expressed belief: It is obtained by placing all the probability masses associated with the intervals ð0; yÞ and ðy; 1Þ at the extreme right of the intervals (note that the bars here represent probability mass, in contrast to the probability density function in the upper figure).
We also assume initially, without loss of generality, that pfd A pfd B . Since we know that the probability of failure of a 1-out-of-2 system cannot be worse than the best channel pfd, we also have
which gives a second percentile of fðpÞ. We thus have two percentiles of the assessor's prior distribution for the system's probability of failure on demand, P F D AB . In general, there will be an infinite number of potential prior probability density functions, fðpÞ, that satisfy (1) and (2). It is easy to see that the most pessimistic of these is the twopoint distribution that has probability mass at pfd A :pfd B (with probability 1-d AB ð0Þ), and probability mass at pfd A (with probability d AB ð0Þ). The reasoning here exactly parallels that in [1] , described earlier: The most pessimistic two-point distribution is one that moves the probability mass in the intervals ð0; pfd A :pfd B Þ and ðpfd A :pfd B ; pfd A Þ as far to the right as possible (i.e., to the right-hand end of each interval).
Since the assessor's probability that the system fails on a randomly selected demand is just the mean of his (in this case, prior) distribution of P F D AB , we have This bound is the value that the assessor can treat as his true (prior) probability of failure of the system on a randomly selected demand, and be assured that it is a conservative (although attainable) number. Of course, this prior bound may not be of practical value-it may be very conservative for reasonable values of d AB ð0Þ. However, as in the case of a single system [1] , things become more interesting and useful when evidence is available of extensive failure-free working of the 1-outof-2 system. When N demands have been executed by the system and no failures have been seen, 4 the assessor's belief about P F D AB changes from his prior distribution, fðpÞ, via Bayes' theorem. His posterior distribution is fðp j N failure-free demandsÞ ¼ ð1 À pÞ N fðpÞ
The assessor's posterior probability of failure on a randomly selected demand is the mean of this distribution:
The question now is which of the infinite number of prior density functions f that satisfy (1) and (2) are the most pessimistic, i.e., maximize (5) . In general, there will be an infinite number of these. We can show that, once again, one of these is a two-point distribution, i.e., this distribution has the same posterior expectation as the (many) other most pessimistic priors. This distribution has probability mass concentrated at pfd A :pfd B , as before, and probability mass concentrated at a point z AB ðNÞ, where z AB ðNÞ is the value of z that maximizes the posterior mean:
The conservative "true" system pfd is then the value (6) takes at its maximum, i.e., 
The assessor's doubt that the failures of the two channels are NWTI changes as he observes N failure-free demands, from his prior belief d AB ð0Þ to posterior:
in an obvious notation. The conservative posterior distribution of the system pfd, (4), is a two-point distribution with probability mass (1 À d AB ðNÞ) at the "independence" point, pfd A :pfd B , and probability mass d AB ðNÞ at z AB ðNÞ, which has the mean given by (7) . For proof of these statements, see the Appendix. The reader should note that "conservative" here refers only to the mean value of the system pfd: From the infinite number of prior distributions that satisfy the assessor's expressed beliefs, (1) and (2), there is none that gives a larger posterior mean pfd than (8) . The "conservative" posterior distribution here may not be conservative in other respects. For example, it has no probability mass to the right of the point z AB ðNÞ, which many assessors might regard as too optimistic. What has happened here-are these results useful? Clearly, the assessor's conservative "true" prior system probability of failure on demand, at approximately 10 À4 , is not a very useful improvement on the single channel pfds. However, the conservative "true" posterior system probability of failure on demand, pfd AB ð2;000Þ, is almost two orders of magnitude better than the crude bound 10 À3 (the probability of failure of the best channel). It is also considerably better than the "black-box" 99 percent confidence bound 2:65 Â 10 À3 , which is obtained by treating the system as a single black box about which nothing is known except that it has survived 2,000 demands without failure [11] .
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL: EXAMPLES
Furthermore, confidence in "no worse than independence" of A, B channel failures has increased to over 0.96 from the assessor's original 0.90. The right-hand point, z, of the conservative two-point distribution has moved to the left, closer to the "independence" point pfd A :pfd B .
In general, the final (conservative) claim for system pfd depends upon: the channel probabilities of failure on demand, pfd A ; pfd B ; the prior doubt, d AB ð0Þ, about the channel failures being no worse than independent; the number of failure-free system demands, N, that have been seen. One way the results of Section 2 could be used would be to see whether any points in this (pfd A ; pfd B ; d AB ð0Þ; N) space seem feasible. For example, given the values of pfd A ; pfd B ; d AB ð0Þ, we could see how many test cases need to be executed (and show no failures) to obtain a particular value of pfd AB ðNÞ: In many cases, such as reactor protection systems, the cost of generating test cases may be high so that a large N may be infeasible. Alternatively, given the values of pfd A ; pfd B ; N (where here N is regarded as the size of the largest practically feasible test set), we could calculate the required d AB ð0Þ, and ask whether such a belief could be trusted (for example, supported by evidence about the diversity-seeking decisions [10] , [14] taken during system design and build). We believe that using our approach to challenge parts of safety cases in this way may be its most useful contribution.
We shall illustrate the general approach via the real example of a safety-critical protection system discussed briefly in Section 1. The aim was to claim a pfd of 10 À6 for the two-channel system, each channel of which is softwarebased. The individual channel pfds are estimated conservatively at 10 À4 and 10 À2 , respectively. The system claim, 10 À6 , is then obtained by multiplying these two channel claims. In our private discussions with safety engineers and assessors, we understood that the reasoning here is that "modest" dependence between channel failures will be more than countered by the conservatism of the individual channel pfd claims: The claim of 10 À6 for the system pfd will then be conservative.
We have already expressed our skepticism about such a tradeoff. We now sketch out how the system claim of 10 À6 might be supported by the kind of reasoning of Section 2. In particular, we show how many failure-free demands of the system need to be observed to support the claim for different levels of doubt about "no worse than independence," and different degrees of conservatism in the channel pfd claims. Table 1 shows the results of our analysis when the assessor believes the channel pfds are no worse than 10 À4 and 10 À3 , respectively. For the three different values of an assessor's doubt about NWTI, 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, the table shows the value of N for which the system pfd claim 10 À6 can be supported. Thus, the number in bold for F AB ðz AB ðNÞÞ in the second row of the table corresponds to N ¼ 43;667, the smallest number of failure-free demands that allow a system pfd claim of better than 10 À6 when the initial doubt is 0.10. These results are somewhat unforgiving: For the two most modest values of the doubt, the numbers of failure-free demands needed are rather high. This amount of operational testing may not be feasible for some applications. For example, it is an order of magnitude greater than what was feasible 20 years ago in the case of the Sizewell B PPS software [12] . However, there have been significant advances in computing speeds in the past 20 years, and much larger simulations are now possible: For example, 50,000 test cases may be generated as part of the assessment of the C&I functions of the UK's proposed EPR [5] .
For the smallest doubt, 0.01, represented by the last two lines of the table, on the other hand, only 1,055 failure-free demands are required, and this does seem sufficiently modest to be feasible in many cases. Table 2 shows the results for a similar calculation when the channel pfds are no worse than 10 À4:5 and 10 À2:5 , respectively. As in Table 1 , these numbers are chosen so that their product-the "independence" case-is 10 À7 . The final row of the table shows that, in this case, no failure-free demands are needed to make the conservative claim that the system pfd is better than 10 À6 : This claim can be made simply from the prior beliefs about the channel pfds when the doubt about NWTI is 0.01.
Finally, in Table 3 the results are shown for a calculation in which the channel pfds are no worse than 10 À5 and 10 À2 . 
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Again the product-the "independence" case-has been chosen to be 10 À7 . In this case, the required conservative system pfd claim of no worse than 10 À6 can be made for values of d AB ð0Þ of 0.01 and 0.05 a priori, i.e., without seeing any failure-free working. Even when the doubt is 0.1, the required number of failure-free system demands is only 10,642, which is more modest than the numbers required for the examples of Tables 1 and 2 .
The results of Table 3 are less unforgiving than those of the other two tables. This seems to be because the channels are more asymmetric: Channel A is much more reliable than channel B, and indeed pfd A is only a single order of magnitude short of the overall system goal of 10 À6 . Since the system pfd cannot be worse than the best channel pfd, quite modest confidence in NWTI means that the contribution from the second channel is sufficient to make the expected system pfd smaller than the required 10 À6 . These numbers are, of course, merely illustrative. They are intended to give the reader some feel for the tradeoffs that are likely between "independence doubt", channel pfds, and extensiveness of failure-free testing.
All the results above are obtained numerically: There is no closed form expression for F AB ðz AB ðNÞÞ. An alternative approach to the one above allows exact closed form results. It involves a kind of backward reasoning in which an assessor-say a regulator-begins with a prior subjective doubt, say D, about NWTI, based on his review of the diversity-seeking practices adopted during the system development. That is,
We assume that the system pfd requirement is P AB , arising from the wider safety case, i.e., EðP F D AB j N failure-free demandsÞ P AB :
Then it can be shown that the upper bound on the prior doubt about NWTI required to satisfy (11) is
where z AB ðNÞ ¼ minðpfd A ; pfd B ; z m Þ; ð13Þ
Here, z AB ðNÞ is the upper point of support of the twopoint distribution that is the most pessimistic prior (the other point of support being pfd A Â pfd B ), as before. This upper point of support will be z m when this is smaller than each of the channel pfds. For any given channel pfds, this will happen when N is large enough, specifically when N > N C , where
In that case,
For proofs and details of closed form expressions for d req , see Appendix.
All this might be used in a two-stage procedure as follows: An assessor, such as a regulator, having arrived at a probability D that represents his prior doubt about NWTI, would compute d req (based on the known values of pfd A , pfd B , N, and P AB ) and compare this with D . If d req < D, he would reject the claim P AB , (11 ; the values of pfd B are in the same range, but starting from the bottom, so that for each row pfd A Â pfd B ¼ 10 À7 . The three tables differ in the number, N, of failure-free demands observed.
The tables clearly show the way in which asymmetry in the channel pfds aids the assessment: The more asymmetric these are, all things being equal, the greater the prior doubt about NWTI can be while still allowing the claim about the system pfd. Thus, in Table 4 , the greatest doubt that can be allowed occurs when pfd A ¼ 10 À2 ; pfd B ¼ 10 À5 (or vice versa). Similar results apply in Tables 5 and 6 , although, for these larger values of N, the differences between the largest allowable doubt and the smallest, over the range of values of the channel pfds, is less pronounced.
Notice that the value of d req for large values of N, (15), depends on the channel probabilities of failure on demand, pfd A and pfd B , only via their product. The extent to which this product is smaller than P AB can be thought of as representing the degree of conservatism in the system pfd claim, compared with an overoptimistic claim of certain independence of channel failures. This is similar to the informal reasoning we reported in Section 1, but in our more formal treatment, the system claim is guaranteed to be conservative (for the assessor's particular level of doubt about NWTI). In Table 4 , the central rows all have d req ¼ 0:024. That is because for these values of the channel pfds; N ¼ 10;000 is sufficiently large to satisfy (14) -that is, z m is smaller than each channel pfd-and so in (15) d req depends on the individual channel pfds only via their product, which is 10 À7 in each row. This effect is even more pronounced in Tables 5  and 6 , in which N is larger.
There is an obvious interplay here between channel pfd asymmetry and the size of N: High asymmetry essentially means that one of the pfds is very small, and N C in (14) is thus large. So, in Table 4 , where N is of quite modest size, the "best"-that is, the largest-acceptable doubt is a factor of four greater than that where the channel pfds are approximately equal in size.
In Table 6 , in contrast, N is sufficiently large that for almost all values of the channel pfds it is greater than N C and so d req takes the same value in almost all cases. That is, channel asymmetry cannot be exploited here to increase allowable doubt in NWTI. Or, putting it more positively, for such large N there is no need to have one channel very much more reliable than the other to gain benefit in the size of d req . Tables 7, 8, and 9 show similar results in a case where there is greater conservatism in the channel pfd claims: Here the product is 10 À8 in contrast to the 10 À7 of the previous tables.
Some Observations Arising from These Examples
From a practical viewpoint an important question is how best to build (and test) a system so that the resulting d req is larger than D . It seems that asymmetry of the channel pfds might be helpful here. However, since this essentially means that one of the channel pfds needs to be close to the required system pfd, it may not be a practical proposition in cases where very high system reliability is needed. In fact, such asymmetry goes against the spirit of this kind of fault tolerance, which is to build highly reliable systems from channels of only modest reliability. The other factors affecting d req are the conservatism of the system pfd claim (i.e., how much it differs from the too optimistic simple product of the channel pfds), and the number of (failure-free) test cases observed. A comparison between Tables 4, 5, 6 and Tables 7, 8, 9 indicates the Readers might well ask at this stage whether this new approach could be used in practice for the assessment of real systems, bearing in mind that for safety critical applications the system pfd requirement may be a stringent one. The numerical value of P AB used in our examples here is, as we have said, one that we know to be the requirement for a real critical system. The issue then is whether the numbers in the tables above are plausible ones to be part of a safety assessment to support a claim of this magnitude. That is, for a particular instance (i.e., a row of one of the Tables 4, 5 Of course, such questions can really only be answered when there is specific evidence available about a particular system. However, we believe-somewhat tentatively-that it is reasonable to answer in the affirmative in some of the cases above (see Table 9 ). Here there is considerable conservatism in the channel claims (product equals 10 À8 versus a system claim of 10 À6 ), so that an assessor's doubt about NWTI can be as high as 23 percent and still allow him to accept the system claim. He can do this without appealing to channel asymmetry (i.e., an implausibly strong claim for one of the channels) because the middle row of the table shows that claims of 10 À4 for each channel will be sufficient. Such claims seem relatively modest for channels that have been built to safety-critical standards: For example, they could be supported by feasible amounts of operational testing. The number of system tests cases (100,000) that need to be generated is large, of course. Whether this is feasible will depend on particular circumstances, but we note that for a real protection system it is proposed to generate 50,000 test cases [5] . Notice, however, that even 100,000 test cases is more than an order of magnitude fewer than would be TABLE 8  As Table 7 , but with N ¼ 50;000 
DISCUSSION
We have presented a new way of reasoning about the reliability of a two-channel, 1-out-of-2 software-based system that overcomes some of the objections that can be made about an earlier approach to the problem. This earlier approach can be characterized as follows: "We realize that an assumption of independence between failures (and thus a claim for system pfd that is the simple product of channel pfds) may be too optimistic, but we have compensated for that by making only very conservative claims for the channel pfds. The system pfd claim will thus be conservative."
We believe the work reported here captures the spirit of this informal reasoning, but does so in a way that is more rigorous. It gives a rigorous meaning to notions of "conservative," and allows proper tradeoffs to be made between the different model parameters (prior doubt about NWTI, number of failure-free tests observed, product of channel pfds, system pfd claim). However, the attentive reader will have noticed that this new approach brings its own problems and some difficulties that need further thought.
In the first place, we have assumed in the development of Section 2 that the channel probabilities of failure on demand, pfd A and pfd B , are known. In practice, of course, these probabilities will not be known with certainty. One way forward would be to use the ideas in [1] , where it was shown how to obtain a conservative bound for the posterior mean of the pfd of a single system based on an assessor's prior belief and the observation of some failure-free demands in statistically representative operational testing. Such bounds could be used by an assessor as if they were "true" pfds, in the knowledge that they will be conservative.
The testing of the different channels to obtain these pfds would be carried out before the system testing required for the results of Sections 2 and 3. In this model there is no further "learning" about these channel pfds from the system testing. That is, the likelihood function used in the Bayesian updating in Section 2 does not allow any updating of the assessor's beliefs about the channel pfds. The evidence from the system testing is just that there have been no system failures in N tests, but the assessor does not know whether there have been individual channel failures. Informally, the Bayesian updating in Section 2 concerns only the channel failure dependence via the evolution of d AB ðNÞ and z AB ðNÞ as N increases, but not any evolution of the channel reliabilities.
This may be realistic in some cases: For example, in the case of shut-down systems, when a preferred channel correctly causes shut-down, the other channel may not be invoked and so it may not be known if it would have failed to shut down on that demand. However, in many cases this view will be too restrictive, and the system tests will also give information about channel outcomes. In such cases, it would be useful to extend the model to be able to take account of this information: This is an issue we plan to address in future work. In fact, such an extended model may also allow greater confidence to be gained in NWTI: informally seeing some single channel failures, but no system failures, may give greater confidence in the efficacy of the fault tolerance mechanism (albeit less confidence in the reliabilities of the channels).
A major difficulty in this model, of course, centers upon the assessor's prior doubt about no-worse-than-independence of channel failures. Is it reasonable to expect an assessor to be able to state a numeric value for D , and for this number to be genuinely meaningful, rather than simply an uninformed guess? Interestingly, in private discussions with safety engineers and regulators familiar with these kinds of multichannel systems we have found a willingness to express numerically their confidence about independence itself: For example, "I am 90 percent confident that failures of these channels will be independent." In supporting such claims the experts usually appeal to their detailed knowledge of the architectures of the target systems, and on how they were built.
As we have argued here, claims about independence itself-a point on the dependence spectrum-do not seem realistic, and a better way to proceed is to make claims that are framed in terms of intervals, such as our "no worse than independence." It is interesting to ask whether the same experts would be able to support these claims using evidence from system architectures, and details of the design and build processes. Using such evidence to support probabilistic measures of doubt, as is required here, may not be easy.
Because of these difficulties, we think that the most plausible use for our work might lie in providing challenges to claims based upon the kind of informal "trade-off" arguments we criticized in Section 1. Such a challenge might be of the following form: "You say that your channel pfd claims are pessimistic by these amounts, and that you have seen this number of representative failure-free test cases, it follows that, to support your system pfd claim, your doubt in NWTI needs to be smaller than this number." That is, our work can be seen as a way of "policing" assessor claims by revealing what is needed to be believed to support a system claim: Such required beliefs may be unreasonable in the view of, say, a nuclear regulator, and thus open the claim to rejection.
Of course, it would help to have empirical evidence of the levels of dependence between diverse software-based channels in some real-life systems. Unfortunately, such evidence is very thin on the ground. However, a single data point comes from the multiversion experiment conducted by Knight and Leveson [6] . There the null hypothesis of NWTI was not rejected for 139 out of 162 pairs of versions. That is, the estimated doubt in NWTI for a randomly selected pair was 0.142 [13] which compares favorably with the 0.23 doubt in the discussion of the previous section. It has to be said, though, that the problem addressed here was not comparable to a real safety-critical application, such as a protection system, and the versions were not developed under the kind of conditions that might be expected of such applications.
Ideally, we would like to have empirical evidence of the channel dependences achieved in real systems. We are not aware of such evidence being available currently, in spite of several well-known multichannel software-based systems having received extensive operational exposure. What is needed is that channel "vote-outs" be recorded in those situations where there is no system failure (as well as when there is system failure, of course). We are not aware that this is done as a matter of course in any existing systems, and have seen no published data of this kind.
Even if such data were available, across many disparate safety-critical systems in operation, there would be difficulties in an assessor using them to make a judgment about his confidence in NWTI for a particular novel system, since this new one may differ in significant ways from the previous ones.
However, in some industries, there may be considerable experience in building "similar" systems in the past: for example, protection systems. Let us assume that these earlier systems have been successful, in the sense that they were accepted as sufficiently safe to be deployed, and these judgments were not overruled by operational experience. An assessor could retrospectively compute d req for each of these previous systems. It might then be conservative for him to use, say, the smallest of these numbers as his prior doubt, D, for a novel system. Such a choice could be regarded as ensuring that the procedure for assuring the safety of a new system was no worse-that is, no less stringent-than that adopted historically.
APPENDIX A A.1 Finding a Worst-Case Prior Distribution
A.1.1 Statement
Let P be the system pfd treated as a random variable with density fðpÞ, where 0 p z 0 1.
Here, we show that EðP j N failure free demandsÞ
where
and the bound (A1) is reached with the two-point prior probability distribution of P :
Lemma. If q is a positive random variable and N is a positive integer, then
Proof. If x ! 0 and a ! 1, the function fðxÞ ¼ x a is convex, so, by Jensen's inequality,
which implies
Proof of the statement. Let us introduce four (unknown) values p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , and p 4
Obviously,
In accordance with the lemma:
We can now use the values p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , and p 4 to write down an expression for EðP j N successful runsÞ:
Applying (A4) and (A5) in (A6), we finally obtain the following upper bound:
and the bound (A7) is obviously reached when one chooses the two-point prior distribution of P :
The unknown values p 1 and p 2 are found as a solution of the two-dimensional optimization problem
subject to constraints:
In general, p 1 and p 2 may differ from y and z 0 . However,
because (A2) implies p 1 p 2 . Thus, F ðp 1 ; p 2 Þ reaches its minimum when p 1 ¼ y.
Using the following substitution, we obtain the result in the main body of the paper for a "1-out-of-2" system with known pfd A , pfd B , and P ðpfd AB > pfd A pfd B Þ ¼ d AB ð0Þ,
A.2 Finding Required Prior Doubt d req
A.2.1 The Problem
Here, we aim at finding the required prior doubt d req , satisfying and z minimizes function F AB ðuÞ:
given the parameters P AB , pfd A , pfd B , and N are known. 
Thus, in accordance with (A13) and (A14), every stationary point z 0 of F AB ðzÞ satisfies the equation
If F AB ðuÞ reaches the required minimum 1 À P AB at a stationary point z 0 within the segment ½y; z 0 , then
and F AB ðzÞ reaches the required minimum 1 À P AB at the end z ¼ z 0 of the segment ½y; z 0 , because F AB ðyÞ ¼ 1 À y ! P AB . Therefore,
Inequality (A16) can be rewritten as follows:
A.2.3 Finding d req
Now, let us denote
rewrite (A8) as following: 
Equality (A17) implies
and
Substituting (A11), (A20), and (A21) into (A19), we finally obtain . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
